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TRANSPORTEQUIPMENT
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT accounted for nearly a quarter of OECD
exports of manufactured metals and machinery in 1963. Over half of
these exports represented trade among the OECD countries themselves;
an even higher proportion of aircraft exports (probably near 75per
cent) had OECD destinations while railway equipment was exported
mainly (nearly 80 per cent) to non-OECD countries (Appendix A and
sources cited). The United States accounted for about one-fourth of
OECD transport equipment exports; and Germany, for almost as much.
The addition of the United Kingdom raises the three-country share to
nearly two-thirds of the OECD total (Table 14.1). At over 50 per cent,
the U.S. share was highest in aircraft, one of the highest single-country
proportions for any major manufactured product. The German share
was highest in road motor vehicles. In ships, Japan was already by 1963
the most important single exporter. Import sources among markets
differed greatly, with the United States dominant in the Western hemi-
sphere and Japan; and the EEC countries, in Europe.
The U.S. share of OECD exports declined from almost half in 1953
to a quarter in 1964, with the main change taking place before 1961
(Table 14.2). The U.K. share also fell, although not quite as sharply.
Large gains were made by Germany, the other EEC countries, and
Japan. Between 1961 and 1964 the U.S. and U.K. shares in transport
equipment exports declined, while the EEC and Japan gained.
International prices of transport equipment rose by 10 to more than
20 per cent between 1953 and 1964 (Table 14.3). Most of the increases
occurred in the earlier years, prices having been rather stable in 196 1—
64 except for a U.K. rise. During these recent years the decline in the
Note: SITC 73. Value of OECD Exports in 1963: $10.5 billion; 23.6 per cent of study


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1963 10,496 100.0 25.8 16.8 42.6 22.3 6.0
1962 9,437 100.0 29.0 16.8 40.9 5.0








1957 7,226 100.036.3 20.3 30.1 16.2 5.9
1953 4,720 100.046.9 22.0 21.5 9.1 2.5
Source: Appendix B.
U.K. share is thus in the direction that would be expected from changes
in relative prices. The same cannot, on the other hand, be said of the
decline in the U.S. share; U.S. price competitiveness improved after
1961, markedly with respect to the United Kingdom and marginally
vis-à-vis the EEC countries. However, the largest share gainers during
this period were Japan and other OECD countries, for which we do
not have price indexes except for some individual groups for Japan.
U.S. price levels in 1964 were notably above those of Germany and
the United Kingdom and slightly above those of the EEC as a whole.
These overall average price relationships conceal widely differing
situations for the major types of transport equipment. In railway vehicles
and aircraft, price trends were favorable to the United States, and its
prices were lower, particularly at the end of the period, than those of its
chief OECD competitors. For ships and boats the opposite was true:
EEC and Japanese prices declined from around two-thirds of U.S. prices
in 1953 to roughly half in 1964. The picture was more mixed in the
important road motor vehicle group.Transport Equipment 425
Table 14.3
International Prices, Price Competitiveness, and Price Levels, Transport
Equipment,1953, 1957,1961—64
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
INTERNATIONAL PRICE INDEXES (1962 =100)
U.s. 89 94 96 100 99 100
U.K. 87 94 100 100 102 107
EEC 94 98 97 100 101 102
Germany 90 95 96 100 101 101
INDEXES OF U.S. PRICE COMPETITIVENESS (1962 =100)
Relative to
U.K. 98 100 104 100 103 107
EEC 107 105 101 100 101 102
Germany 102 101 100 100 102 101
INTERNATIONAL PRICE LEVELS (U.S. FOR EACH YEAR =100)
U.s. 100 100 100 100 100 100
U.K. 85 87 90 87 89 93
EEC 102 100 96 96 97 98
Germany 94 94 92 93 94 93
Source: International price indexes from Appendix C; price competitiveness indexes,
Appendix D; price levels, Appendix E.
Railway Vehicles'
Trade
Most OECD exports of railway vehicles were to the less developed
countries. The OECD countries were the destination of only about $110
million of railway vehicle exports in 1963 (Appendix A), and only
Germany sold most of its exports within Europe. The United States,
the United Kingdom, and Japan had practically no sales to European
countries; the great bulk of their sales went to less developed countries.
Exports to all the main railway vehicle exporting countries—the United
1SITC731. Value of OECD exports in 1963: $0.5 billion; 1.0 per cent of study total.
Coverage: Railway locomotives, freight and passenger cars, and parts.426 Product Reports
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan—came to less than
$15 million.
To some extent, the country pattern of trade reflects its commodity
composition. The United States specialized in diesel locomotives (SITC
731.3), in which it was the dominant exporter (Table 14.4), and these
were mainly imported by less developed countries. Germany, on the
other hand, specialized in freight and passenger cars, of which a much
higher proportion was bought .by European countries. Freight cars in
'particular are bulky to ship and comparatively easy to manufacture or
assemble, and therefore have been more subject to competition from
local manufacture in less developed countries than locomotives. Electric
locomotives, a minor item in which the EEC countries were the chief
exporters, were sent almost entirely to less developed countries.
A specialization not revealed by the published trade data is that
within diesel locomotives, U.S. firms produced mainly diesel electric
locomotives,2 while European firms led 'in production of diesel hydraulic
locomotives. This specialization produced the rare phenomenon of loco-
motive imports into the United States: Twenty-one high-horsepower
diesel hydraulic locomotives were ordered from Germany by two west-
ern railroads, operating along mountainous routes.3 In these very high
horsepower ranges, European, rather than U.S., producers, have been
the technological leaders.
Railway vehicle exports by OECD countries have been relatively
stagnant during the years covered by the study, ranging only between
$400 and $500 million except in 1961 (Table 14.5). Export origins
changed, however. The chief trends were a drastic decline in the U.K.
share—from 28 per cent in 1953 to only 12 per cent in 1964which
involved a fall in the absolute value of exports as well, and a gain in
the share of Canada and Japan from 4 to 12 per cent. The fall in the
U.K. export share took place mainly between 1953 and 1961, and was
accompanied by a substantial rise in the shares of both the United States
and Japan, but the U.S. share fell back sharply by 1964.
Within the EEC, Germany gained at the expense of its partners,
whose exports in 1964 were lower in absolute value than in 1953.
U.S. dominance in locomotive exports goes back at least to 1957,
2 As can be seen in the locomotive orders data for the earlier years of the study pub-
lished in various issues of Railway Age (January 14, 1957, for example).


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Share in OECD Exports(per cent)
EEC
Ger-








1963 459 100.0 30.5 12.6 35.5 16.1 10.9
1962 442 100.0 35.0 12.7 33.5 15.2 14.4








1957 478 100.0 30.924.5 30.2 13.0 7.0
1953 426 100.0 25.427.9 40.5 14.2 2.2
Source: Appendix B.
but it has declined since then, and the U.S. share in other roffing stock
has fallen substantially. The United Kingdom has lost ground as an
exporter in both major types of rolling stock, while Germany has gained
substantially in exports of railway vehicles other than locomotives.
Over time, the horsepower range of locomotives exported from the
United States shifted considerably (see Table 14.6). More than 40 per
cent, by number, of the locomotives exported in 1953 were of less than
600 horsepower, while in later years the proportion was rarely as high
as the 16 per cent of 1964. On the other hand, locomotives of more
than 2,400 horsepower, which did not appear in the export records at
all before 1962, accounted for almost a quarter of exports in the last
two years shown. In value of exports, of course, the more powerful
locomotives are of still greater importance, since their prices are as
much as twice as high as those of the smaller locomotives.
Non price Factors in Trade
One feature of the trade pattern for railway vehicles that suggests
the unlikelihood of finding a close relationship between our measures430 Product Reports
Table 14.6
U.S. Exports of Diesel Locomotives, by Horsepower,
1953, 1957, 1961—64
H.P. Range 1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
NUMBER OF LOCOMOTIVES
Under 600 52 4 29 40 18 39
600—1,200 55 101 276 78 164 58
1,300—2,400 13 206 267 313 209 104
Over 2,400 6 40 133 60
Total 120 311 578 471 524 261
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION
Under 600 43 1 5 8 3 16
600—1,200 46 32 48 17 31 22
1,300—2,400 11 66 46 66 40 40
Over 2,400
. 8 25 23
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note:Data are from Railway Age, January 20, 1964, and from corresponding
Review and Outlook issues for earlier and later years.
of prices and the flow of trade is the concentration among sources of
supply for particular importing countries; that is, many importing coun-
tries tend to purchase all, or almost all, of their locomotives or freight
cars from a single exporter in any one year and even over considerable
periods of time.
A possible explanation for this concentration is that the flow of
trade might be determined almost without regard to current prices, by
long-standing, supplier relationships, by the need for compatibility be-
tween existing and new equipment, by the economy of taking advan-
tage of existing stocks of spare parts and of employees' familiarity with
previously purchased equipment, by special financing arrangements, and
by other factors not reflected in price as we measure it. The operation
of such factors is suggested by some aspects of the trade pattern.
The operation of nonprice factors is suggested by the tendency of
many importers to buy from countries with which there is, or was, aTransport Equipment 431
political relationship. The formerly French territories of Mauritania,
Senegal, the Malagasy Republic, Niger, and Algeria, for example, pur-
chased more than 96 per cent of their imports of railway vehicles and
parts from France during the period 1958—64, while Kenya, Rhodesia,
and Tanganyika imported almost entirely from the United Kingdom.
The concentration is even greater for diesel locomotives in the four
years for which data are available, 196 1—64. The former French terri-
tories mentioned above imported all their locomotives from France.
Some flows of trade may have been associated with military or for-
eign aid relationships (South Korea and South Vietnam purchasing
locomotives from the United States), and some may be examples of
the influence of price, or of the other factors mentioned above. Peru,
Israel, and Tunisia bought their diesel locomotives in the United States;
New Zealand, in Canada; and Nigeria, in Germany. Data on freight
cars are available only for 196 1—63, but the same pattern emerges,
with many countries buying all or almost all of their imports from a
single source.
Because railroad investment for any particular line, and often for a
whole country, is made in large lumps, the tendency to stay with one
supplier is reinforced. A frequent pattern is of large-scale re-equipping
for a few years followed by several years of small purchases, for which
a change in supplier would be even more uneconomical than for a large
investment. For example, Algeria made large purchases in 1958—59,
and then much Smaller ones in the following years. Nigeria's purchases
were concentrated in 1958—60; Greece's in 1958—59 and 1962—63;
Chile's in 1962—63; and those of the Union of South Africa, 1958—60.
This concentration in time implies active bidding in one or two years,
followed by several years in which at least part of the trade flow is de-
termined by the results of the first year's competition.4
If the entire country is taken as a unit in examining trade data, the
degree to which one year's purchase source determines the next year's
tends to be underestimated. The larger countries have more than one
railway line, and for any particular railroad the tendency to remain
with the same supplier, ignoring current prices, would be stronger than
for the country as a whole. Whatever the reason, the origin of a coun-
try's impotts in any one year is clearly not independent of the origin
4Tradeby Commodities, OECD StatisticalBulletin,Series C,1964, and earlier
volumes.432 Product Reports
of the previous year's imports, and this correlation goes far beyond
what could be explained on grounds of geographical proximity.
The pattern of trade in railway vehicles may be determined more by
sources and types of financing than by what are usually regarded as
price considerations. A large fraction of railway equipment imports
were financed outside the importing countries, particularly in the case
of imports by. less developed countries. Total exports of railway ve-
hicles by OECD countries to non-OECD countries amounted to almost
$4 billion for 1953—63. As of the end of 1963, the International Bank
had disbursed approximately three-fourths of. a billion dollars in rail-
road loans signed in the years beginning with fiscal year 1953, the
Export-Import Bank disbursed almost one-half a billion dollars for the
same purpose in that period, and the Agency for International Develop-
ment and its predecessor agencies lent more than $200 million for rail-
road equipment.6
World Bank loans have always involved international competitive
bidding, but Eximbank and, in the later years of the study, AID financ-
ing were tied to the purchase of equipment in the United States.is
likely that a substantial proportion of other countries' aid has also been
tied to the purchase of equipment from the lending country.
For the United States alone, total exports of railway vehicles were
about $1.2 billion between 1953 and 1963, and U.S. aid financing was
large enough to have accounted for a Substantial part of that sum.
However, it is difficult to make direct comparisons because the proceeds
of a railroad development loan can be spent on products outside of
SITC 731, such as rail or ties, construction or repair of vehicles, track,
or other facilities, machine tools for repair shops, or various iron or
steel products. On the other hand, some purchases of locomotives or
other railway vehicles may be financed under loans for port or mining
development or under mixed-purpose loans.
Price Trends
Information on price trends for all railway vehicles .since1953 is
available only for the EEC, Germany, and the United States. All show
price increases over the period as a whole, somewhat greater in the
5SeeStatement of Loans, IBRD, December 31, 1963; Report to the Congress, Export-
Import Bank of Washington, annual issues, 1952—63, Part II; and various issues of the
Operations Report of the Agency for International Development and the International
Cooperation Administration, and Paid Shipments reports of the Mutual Security Agency.Transport Equipment 433
Table 14.7
International Prices, Railway Vehicles, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962 =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
ALL RAILWAYVEHICLES (SITC 731)
U.s. 83 96 102 100 101 102
U.K. NA NA 103 100 104 NA
EEC 74 84 95 100 101 103
Germany 74 84 95 100 101 103
LOCOMOTIVES(SITC 731.1—731.3)
U.S. 100 108 103 100 99 98
U.K. NA NA 106 100 98 NA
Germany 74 83 94 100 101 103
Source: Appendix C.
EEC and Germany than in the United States, where the 1964 level was
only six percentage points above that of 1957 as compared with nine-
teen percentage points in the other cases (Table 14.7).
Locomotive export price behavior for the two areas contrasted par-
ticularly strongly: U.S. prices apparently fell after a rise in 1957, while
German prices, the only EEC prices available, increased by more than
25 per cent. Both countries' prices rose substantially between 1953
and 1957, but after that date U.S. locomotive prices fell in every year
shown, while German prices increased in every year. The German price
indexes are supposed to be free of the influence of quality changes, but
it is possible that, with the aid of a larger amount of information on
the relationship of horsepower to price of locomotives, we were more
successful in producing a quality-adjusted index for the United States
than for Germany, for which we relied heavily on the official export
price data. However, there is evidence that almost any kind of index
for the United States would show a smaller increase in price than the
German series
6Theindex in Table 14.7 indicates a fall of 2 per cent in U.S. prices between 1953
and1964,and thealternativeindexes listed in the appendix to this chapter offer a
range from a 10 per cent decline in U.S. prices to a 10 per cent rise. The 10 per cent
decline is given by a price index constructed by valuing all locomotives purchased in
1963 at the prices that would have been charged in each of the other years, as estimated
from regressions of price on horsepower for each year; and the 10 per cent rise, by434 Product Reports
The German index can be compared with additional U.S. indexes for
1961—64. All the U.S. indexes, some derived from completely inde-
pendent basic data, show stability in U.S. locomotive prices and even
some decline in the last two years, while the German index continued
to rise.7
Like the U.S. index, the U.K. locomotive index, in the few years for
which it is available, declined substantially.
In railway vehicles as a whole in the first few years, U.S. prices rose
more rapidly than Common Market prices. After 1961, American prices
were stabilized, while EEC prices continued to increase. U.S. prices of
freight cars rose much more than European ones, and much more than
U.S. parts prices.
Possibilities for comparing the NBER indexes for the United States
with other time-to-time measures, such as unit values and wholesale
prices, are very few. No railroad equipment is included in the export
unit value index of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Bureau
of Labor Statistics wholesale price index covers railway roffing stock
only since 1961.
The BLS index was very stable, showing only a rise of half a per-
centage point in 1962 and a decline, later reversed, of about the same
amount after mid-1963. The NBER international price index declined
slightly in 1962 and then rose, but ended in 1964 at virtually the 1961
level. Thus, the two indexes were almost identical in this period. Un-
fortunately, the components of the BLS index have not been pub-
lished, and we do not know, therefore, whether the stability in the BLS
index results, as in the NBER index, from a rise in freight car and parts
prices offset by a decline in locomotive prices.
The Department of Commerce does not use locomotives in its export
unit value index; but the unit value for diesel electric locomotives,
except switching, was quite stable. For 1961 —.64 the unit value (dollars
per locomotive) rose by about 2 per cent, while the NBER index fell
by 4 per cent. The direction of the difference is as expected: Because
an ICC price index, the method of construction of which is not revealed by the source.
The index actually used lies between the other two for 1953—61 and 1953—64. The first
segment is constructed by linking indexes for locomotives of identical horsepower from
year to year. The second segment, based on company reports of export prices, includes
some adjustments, based on the regression, for changes in horsepower of specific loco-
motive models.
7See,however, the section on price competitiveness, below, and the appendix to this
chapter for alternative measures of German price movements.S
TransportEquipment 435
the average horsepower of locomotives has been increasing, the unit
value should be biased upward as a measure of price.
International Price Levels
The United States appears to have been the lowest-priced exporter
of diesel locomotives, except at the beginning of the period, and the
lowest-priced exporter of railway vehicles as a whole, but by a smaller
margin (Table 14.8). Indexes for railway vehicles other than locomo-
tives, not shown in the table except as part of the total, indicate that
the United Kingdom offered lower prices than the United States for
parts of railway vehicles and that EEC prices were higher than those
of the United States by more than 25 per cent in 1953 and by between
5 and 15 per cent in later years. Japanese prices for locomotives also
Table 14.8
Price Levels, Railway Vehicles, 1.953, 1957, 196 1—64
(U.S. for each year =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
ALL RAILWAY VEHICLES (SITC 731)
U.S. 100 100 100 100 100 100
U.K. NA NA 103 102 105 NA
EEC 109 105 115 122 123 125
DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES (SITC 731.3)
U.S. 100 100 100 100 100 100
U.K. NA NA 112 110 115 NA
EEC NA NA 114 NA NA NA
Japan NA NA 104 NA NA NA
Note: Some of these indexes can be compared with indexes derived entirely from
place-to-place data. Taking the United States as 100 in each case, the alternative indexes
are asfollows:
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963
ALL RAILWAY VEHICLES
EEC 101 113 115 133 111
DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES
U.K. 118 112 128 111
EEC 94 112 114 140 110
Source: Appendix E.S
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were substantially higher than U.S. prices for the few years in which
data are available.8
In most of the place-to-place comparisons, of which the indexes of
Table 14.8 are composed, the equivalence, but not exact identity, of the
locomotives offered by the various countries was insured by the re-
quirement that each one meet the purchasers' specifications. In a num-
ber of instances, U.S. companies bid against their European licensees
on the same locomotive models, and these give something of a check
on the other bidding data, since the locomotives offered are alike in
more respects than specified. Unfortunately, these cases are confined
to 1959 and 1960, years for which we did not compute most of our
measures. The ratios of European to U.S. prices for the same locomo-
tive models ranged from 99 to 116 per cent, with an average of not
quite 110 per cent. These comparisons confirm the finding of a U.S.
price advantage in diesel locomotives but suggest a somewhat smaller
difference than that shown in the more comprehensive listing.
The bid data on which the place-to-place indexes are based fall far
short of covering all trade in railway vehicles. Particularly in locomo-
tives, however, some very crude estimates suggest that they cover a
significant part of the trade. The total value of contracts for which
bidding data were examined was over $80 mfflion, and almost all of
them yielded some useful price comparisons, roughly $60 million in
locomotive bids and $15 million in freight car bids. The coverage of
the bids is uncertain, but it is clear that intra-OECD trade and exports
under tied loans or grants are not covered at all. Exports of diesel
locomotives by OECD countriestocountriesoutsidethe OECD
amounted to about $430 million from 1961 through 1963. Over $200
million in loans for railroad equipment were made by U.S. government
agencies, mostly under arrangements which tied purchasers to U.S.
suppliers. These figures suggest that purchases of locomotives not so
8Someprice level comparisons can be made from place-to-place data alone, but they
are more erratic and may be less reliable than those in Table 14.8 because they are
based on a smaller number of observations. As summarized in the note to the table
they confirm that diesel locomotive prices in both the United Kingdom and the EEC
tended to be higher than U.S. prices, and that EEC prices for railway vehicles as a
whole were also generally high. They confirm the upward trend in relative EEC prices
from 1953 to 1961, but the picture for later years is not clear because of the very large
rise in 1962 and fall in 1963. The low 1963 EEC-U.S. ratio casts some doubt on the
steadily rising trend of German locomotive prices after 1961, a trend which is in any
case doubtful because of the reportedly fierce competition in this area. However, the
Germans had not, until 1964, been notably successful in this competition.w
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Table 14.9
U.S. Price Competitiveness, Railway Vehicles, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962= 100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
ALL RAILWAYVEHICLES (SITC 731)
Relative to
U.K. NA NA 102 100 103 NA
EEC 89 86 94 100 100 102
Germany 88 85 94 100 100 101
LOCOMOTIVESAND SELF-PROPELLEDCARS(SITC731.1—731.4)
Relative to
U.K. NA NA 102 100 102 NA
Germany 74 77 91
Source: Appendix D.
100 102 105
tied were somewhat above $200 million in these three years, and some
of these may have been tied to other countries' exporters. During that
period our bid data on locomotives covered roughly $40 million in
contract values.
Price Competitiveness
For railway vehicles as a whole, and notably for locomotives, U.S.
price competitiveness relative to the EEC improved substantially over
1953—64, particularly in the five years 1957—62 (Table 14.9). The
index for all railway vehicles declined from 1953 to 1957 and was
almost stable after 1962, while that for locomotives shows constant
improvement.9 The data for U.S. price competitiveness relative to the
United Kingdom run for too short a period to indicate a trend, but
suggest little change from 1961 through 1963.
Since there were such large changes in price competitiveness of loco-
motives, it might be expected that they would be reflected in shifts in
trade. We compare U.S. price competitiveness relative to Germany with
ratios of German to U.S. exports in Chart 14.1. The shifts in trade do
The alternative indexes, derived from the bid data, which are more erratic and are
composed of a smaller number of observations, confirm the great improvement in U.S.
price competitiveness between 1953 and 1962 and between 1957 and 1962, but suggest
a reversal in 1963.438 Product Reports
Chart 14.1
Price Competitiveness andExportShares in Locomotives, United States
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Note:Export values are from Appendix B; the index of U.S. price competitiveness
is from Table 14.9.
seem consistent with the changes in price competitiveness, except in
1964. In the other three cases the directions of movement are opposite,
as we would expect, and the rates of change appear to be in the appro-
priate order.
The high 1964 ratio of German to U.S. exports might be an accident,
not related to price movements, but it might also reflect on the validity
of the German export price indexes we use. As is mentioned in the
appendix to this chapter, bidding data suggest a considerable decline
in German prices in 1963 and 1964, but there were so few observations
that we did not calculate an index past 1963. The same data also sug-
gest that the price ratio may have moved sharply against the United
States to the extent that the German place-to-place index relative to
the United States may have gone below 100. However, because of the
lack of adequate data, this must be considered only a suspicion, some-
what reinforced by the change in trade flows.—
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Just as changes in trade appear to be consistent with changes in
price competitiveness, the structure of trade seems to fit the estimated
price level relationships reasonably well. U.K. price competitiveness
relative to the United States appears high in railway vehicle parts but
low in locomotives, and U.K. exports of locomotives are much smaller
than those of the United States, while U.K. exports of railway parts
are higher. The EEC price position relative to the United States is more
favorable in freight cars than in locomotives, and EEC exports of freight
cars are far larger than those of the United States, while locomotive
exports are lower.
In summary, we can say that the United States had a dominant com-
petitive position in locomotives, as measured by both price relations
and trade flows, but a lower and declining position in other railway
vehicles, and that these indicators of price competitiveness were appar-
ently reflected in the trade flows despite the many interferences with
price competition mentioned earlier.
Road Motor Vehicles 10
Trade
Motor vehicles, which constitute over 15 per cent of the total OECD
exports covered by our study, have been one of the most dynamic com-
modity groups in the world economy. During the period of the study
(1953—64) motor vehicle production grew more rapidly than industrial
production as a whole, and world trade in motor vehicles expanded
more rapidly than world vehicle production, total world commodity
exports, or world exports of manufactured goods.1'
10 SITC 732. Value of OECD exports in 1963: $6.8 billion; 15.3 per cent of study
total. Coverage: Passenger cars, buses, trucks, road tractors, and motorcycles.
11 These statements are based on the following data:
Ratio:
195319641964/1953
1. Motor vehicle production, exci. motorcycles
(millions of units) 10.5 22.0 210
2. World industrial production (1958100) 78.0155.0 199
3. Motor vehicle exports (billions of dollars) 2.4 7.8 338
4. Manufactured exports (billions of dollars) 35.6 96.7 272
5. Total exports (billions of dollars) 78.3169.8 217
The data above and in the two following paragraphs of text are from: Line 1: Statis-
tical Yearbook, United Nations, 1962 and 1966; line 2: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
United Nations, September 1964, September 1967; line 3: OECD exports (see Table
14.11); lines 4—5:InternationalTrade, 1965, GAT1', p. 1.440 Product Reports
World production of both passenger and commercial vehicles doubled
in terms of units, between 1953 and 1964. U.S. output expanded only
by about a quarter, while in western Europe, where there was a smaller
starting degree of market saturation, the rate of expansion was much
more rapid. The output of commercial vehicles doubled in the four
leading European producing countries, and the production of passenger
cars increased more than threefold in the United Kingdom and France
and more than sevenfold in Italy and Germany. Japan, starting from
very low levels, developed an important motor vehicle industry with
a commercial vehicle capacity second only to that of the United States.12
Despite a decline in its share of world production—from 71 per cent
in 1953 to 42 per cent in 1964, the U.S. industry still produced more
than three times as many units as Gennany, the next biggest producer;
and in value terms the gap was greater. Production became less con-
centrated not only as a result of the rise in the shares of the main
European countries and Japan vis-à-vis the U.S. share, but also because
of rapid growth in other countries including the U.S.S.R., Australia,
Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, Spain, and East Germany.'3
The growth in the output of the major European producers was
stimulated by their ability to sell motor vehicles, particularly passenger
cars, in foreign as well as home markets.'4 In 1964, for example, about
half of German vehicle output was exported. For the United Kingdom
and France exports were about a third of production; and for Italy,
about a quarter. The great growth in Japanese output, on the other
hand, was, at least through 1964, largely directed toward the home
market; only about 10 per cent of output was exported. The United
States, with its major producers owning many foreign manufacturing
subsidiaries, exported only around 3 per cent of its output.
By 1964 Germany was the leading exporter of motor vehicles, having
increased its share of OECD exports from 11 per cent in 1953 to 28
per cent (see Table 14.11). France and Italy also expanded their shares.
The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, dimin-
12 The relative changes described in the text are generally valid descriptions of what
took place, but the actual ratios would vary if other terminal years were compared.
Between 1952 and 1965, for example, U.S. passenger vehicle output more than doubled,
while that of France and the United Kingdom nearly quadrupled and that of Germany
and Italy increased more than ninefold.
'3 All these countries produced at least 100,000 vehicles in 1964, with the U.S.S.R.'s
835,000 by far the largest output.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OECD Exports of Road Motor Vehicles, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(dollars in mfflions)

















ished in relative importance, the former dropping from 46 to 25per
cent and the latter from 26 to 19 per cent. Even their smaller shares in
the rapidly expanding market, however, gave the United States and the
United Kingdom substantially larger motor vehicle export proceeds in
1964 than they had in 1953.
Exports of the major countries differed substantially in their geo-
graphical destination and commodity composition. U.S. exports went
largely to Canada (31 per cent) and to the less developed countries
of Latin America and Asia (48 per cent); only a small fraction (11
per cent) went to European OECD countries (Table 14.10). The domi-
nant markets for the United Kingdom and Japan were n Asia and
Oceania, with OECD Europe a close second destination for the United
Kingdom. Well over half of Germany's exports went to OECD Europe,
but another third went to the United States and Asia.
The United States and Japan, unlike the European countries, ex-
ported more commercial vehicles (SITC 732 subgroups 2, 3, 4, 5,and
7) than passenger cars. Commercial vehicles comprise a wide range of
products that vary in size and purpose. Their single most important usew
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is to haul goods from one place to another. Within this category light
vans and trucks with gross vehicle weights (GVW) of three tons or less
are the most numerous.'5 The vehicles at this smaller end of the range
are mass produced like automobiles, often under the same brand names
and largely from the same parts. Numbers diminish and the large auto-
mobile producers' shares of the market decline with increasing size of
vehicle, since the comparative advantage shifts to smaller and more
specialized truck manufacturers. Styling becomes less important, and
the difficulties of. standardization increase with size, especially as pur-
chasers with large freight volume have greater incentives to seek cost
savings through trucks closely adapted to their specific needs. Thus, in
the United States, for example, the big-three auto manufacturers ac-
counted for nearly 90 per cent of new-truck registrations in 1965 for
vehicles with a GVW of 6,OOO pounds or less but for only around 30
per cent of those with a larger GVW.1° The lighter vehicles almost all
use gasoline engines even in Europe, while the heavier ones are more
likely to be diesel, even in the United States. However, the proportion
of diesel vehicles is higher in Europe; it has recently been estimated at
35percent, while diesels have been accounting for only 5to6 per cent
of U.S. factory sales of trucks.'7
Aside from goods delivery, commercial vehicles are designed for
passenger transport (buses) and a variety of special purposes including
fire fighting, street cleaning, concrete mixing, and mobile lighting, gen-
erating, and testing equipment.
Both in production and in international trade, however, trucks per se
are of overwhelming importance, and we therefore do not regard it as
a serious disadvantage that we rely on truck prices for our time-to-time
index of commercial vehicle prices. In 1963, trucks (SITC 732.3)
accounted for over 70 per cent of OECD commercial vehicle exports.
Most of the balance was made up of special-purpose trucks (SITC
732.4) and chassis for trucks (included with bus chassis in SITC
732.7).
Japan and Italy were the main exporters of motorcycles. Japan's
exports of motorcycles, which exceeded its passenger car exports in
15Grossvehicle weight is the weight of the vehicle plus its payload. The proportion
of the payload rises from around 25 per cent for small vans to more than 75 per cent
for very large trucks. On this and other points see the informative report in the Econ-
omist, July 8, 1967, pp. vii if.
16 Automotive Industries, March 15, 1967, p. 103.
17Economist,July 8, 1967, p. xxv; and Automotive Industries, March 15, 1967, p. 97.Transport Equipment 445
value in 1963, more than tripled between 1962 and 1964, 'and Japan
replaced Italy as the largest motorcycle exporter.
Over half of U.S. exports in this division consisted of parts. For the
European exporters complete vehicles, particularly passenger cars, dom-
inated exports (see Appendix A). The reason for the difference is prob-
ably that, to a much greater extent than the other countries, the United
States had direct investments in automobile plants in Canada, Latin
America, and other areas to which parts that could not be produced
locally on an economical basis were shipped. In many of these markets,
government policies were directed toward the local production of an
increasing proportion of the completed vehicle; however, the expansion
of production in those areas was great enough to keep U.S. parts ex-
ports rising. It is interesting to note that in Latin America where Ger-
many was also involved with direct investment, the share of parts in
German exports approached that of the United States. The United States
also had a relatively favorable price position for parts (see below), but
the low share of parts in U.S. exports to Europe does not support the
hypothesis that price was the main factor accounting for large US.
parts exports.18
Price Trends
For passenger cars, which accounted for about half of 1963 trade
in motor vehicles, regression methods were used to estimate price
changes. The nature of the data, the problems encountered in their use
for our purposes, and the results, which are merely summarized in part
of Table 14.12, are considered more fully in the next chapter. Regres-
sion methods were applied also to trucks for U.S. and U.K. indexes.19
18 Itis possible also that the U.S. reporting system tended to classify incomplete
vehicles with parts to a greater extent than that of other countries. The Europeans fol-
lowed the Brussels nomenclature while the United States did not. The Brussels classifica-
tion, which underlies the SITC, calls for the assignment of incomplete vehicles to the
same category as complete ones as long as they have "the essential character" of the
completed vehicle (e.g., a vehicle without its engine or interior fittings). Cf. Explanatory
Notes to the Brussels Nomenclature, Customs Co-operation Council, 1955, Vol. III,
p. 990. The U.S. classification, at least before 1965, contained a category of "parts
and accessories, n.e.c.—for assembly" which seemed to include all except "complete
knockdown vehicles," and these incomplete vehicles were classified as parts in U.S.
export data. Cf. Schedule B—Statistical Classification of Domestic and Foreign Com-
modities Exported from the United States, January 1, 1958 Edition. Changes effective
through July 1, 1964, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
19 The indexes were derived from double log equations using as independent variables
GVW, wheelbase, displacement, and dummy variables for trucks equipped with a cowl,
for those with. a diesel engine (for the United States after 1962 and for the United
Kingdom), and for forward control (United Kingdom only). The method of flexible'"fl
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Table 14.12
International Prices, Road Motor Vehicles, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962=100)
19531957 1961 19621963 1964
United States
Passenger cars 90 89 94 100 100 100
Commercial vehicles 86 92 93 100 97 93
All motor vehicles 89 91 94 100 99 98
United Kingdom
Passenger cars 98 93 99 100 101 106
Commercial vehicles 81 95 98 100 100 102
All motorvehicles 92 95 100 100 101 106
EEC '
Passenger cars 102 100 95 100 102 102
Commercial vehicles 81 84 94 100 101 102
All motor vehicles 95 95 96 100 102 103
Germany
Passenger cars 95 95 94 100 102 100
Commercial vehicles 81 84 94 100 100 100
All motor vehicles 90 92 95 100 102 101
Source: Appendix C.
The independent variables in the equation relate only to certain stand-
ard features of trucks. Truck sales, especially in the larger sizes, usually
involve custom combinations of features that fit the special needs of
buyers more sophisticated and more expert than passenger car pur-
chasers. Not only are there many body styles 20thatcan be combined
with a given model having a certain gross vehicle weight and displace-
ment, but many of the manufacturers offer a wide choice of options
pooling (see Chapter 5 on regression methods) was applied to successive pairs of years
for each country. The resulting estimates of price changes for U.S. and U.K. commercial
vehicles, shown in Table 14.12, would not have been radically different if alternative
equations with almost equal economic and statistical claims to selection had been used.
The price changes between successive years were usually within one or two percentage
points of those in Table 14.12 and rarely different by more than three or four points.
The differences for successive periods tended to be offsetting, so that the consistent use
of an alternative equation would have in most cases produced a similar estimate of
price change between 1953 and 1964.
20However,truck manufacturers generally build only the smaller truck bodies.Transport Equipment 447
with respect to engines, rear axles, and transmissions, and other features.
However, the high proportion of price variation that our variables were
able to explain is encouraging.
For motor vehicle parts, which account for over one-fourth of the
total trade for the group, we based our indexes partly on the car and
truck price indexes and partly on direct price observations for parts.
Car and truck prices are relevant because a large portion of the so-
called parts trade probably consists of partially completed cars and
trucks.
Over the period 1953—64 the international price indexes for motor
vehicles as a whole rose about 10 per cent in the United States and
Germany (with generally similar timing) and by somewhat more in the
United Kingdom (see Table 14.12). However, there is an important
difference in the pattern of the price changes: In the United States,
passenger car prices rose more and truck prices substantially less than
inEurope.
Our data are presented in Table 14.13 in the form of price relatives
for successive pairs of years so that they may be more readily compared
with official wholesale and export price series reweighted by our inter-
national trade weights. For the United States and Germany, the major
differences between the NBER international price indexes and the
wholesale indexes are in the 1957-to-1953 comparisons, when the for-
mer show only slight price increases whereas the latter show a notable
rise in U.S. prices and a fall in German ones. These differences domi-
nate the results for the period as a whole, and lead to opposite conclu-
sions about the change in the relative price position of the United States
vis-à-vis Germany. Our indexes show a relative decline in U.S. prices
of commercial vehicles but little overall change, while the wholesale
price indexes show a fairly large rise in U.S. prices. In France, the
wholesale prices seem to be biased downward, relative to the NBER
indexes for passenger cars, while in Japan they appear to have an
upward bias. Since our prices for the motor vehicle group for the most
part refer to domestic list prices rather than to export prices (which
have been gathered for virtuallyall other parts of our study), we
attribute the differences to method and, possibly, to sampling variation.
As we stated in Chapter 5,webelieve that our regression methods take
account of a wider segment of the market and are more consistent and
more systematic than those that underlie the official indexes.448 Product Reports
Table 14.13
Official Wholesale and Export and NBER International Price Indexes for













Passenger cars 99 105 107 100 100
Commercial vehicles 107 101 108 97 96
Total 102 104 106 99 99
Wholesale price index
Passenger cars 112 104 99 99 100
Commercial vehicles 113 106 100 99 100
Total 113 105 100 100 99
GERMANY
NBER
Passenger cars 100 99 106 102 98
Commercial vehicles 103 113 106 100 100
Total 101 104 106 101 99
Wholesale price index
Passenger cars 88 105 103 101 100
Commercial vehicles 97 110 102 101 100
Total 93 107 102 101 100
Export price index
Passenger cars 103 100 99 100
Commercial vehicles NA 101 100 100
Total 100 105 100 100 101
FRANCE
NBER
Passenger cars 101 86 105 103 105
Wholesale price index
Passenger cars 103 77 102 102 101
Commercial vehicles' 110 86 103 103 104















Passenger cars NA 71 95 95 97
Wholesale price index .
Passenger cars 73 82 99 99 97
Commercial vehicles 105 92 99 99 100
Total 90 88 99 99 98
Export price index
Passenger cars NA NA 98 98 100
Commercial vehicles NA NA 100 99 100
Total NA NA 99 99 100
Source:International prices from Appendix C; wholesale prices from Appendix F.
Export prices for Germany are from Reihe 1, Preise
und Preisindices ffir Aussenhandelsgflter, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, various
issues; for Japan, Export and Import Price Index Annual, Bank of Japan, various issues.
aFor1957/1954.
bFor 1961/1958.
Anotherway of looking at these changes is through the indexes of
price competitiveness in Table 14.14. In passenger cars, U.S. price com-
petitiveness declined relative to Germany and the EEC; it declined
relative to the United Kingdom also, but recovered in the final year as
U.K. prices rose relative to all the others. Larger changes in price com-
petitiveness, rather consistently favorable to the United States, were
found for trucks.. This finding seems consistent with the relatively better
export performance of the United States in commercial vehicles as com-
pared to passenger cars.
Price Levels
We are able to provide only very rough estimates of differences in
levels of export prices for motor vehicles.
Even in the case of passenger cars, where we had relatively extensive
data (see Chapter 15), product differentiation and differential pricing
between markets made it. difficult to summarize price relationships
between each pair of countries in a single average figure. We obtained-r
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Table 14.14
U.S. Price Competitiveness, Road Motor Vehicles, 1953, 1957, .1961—64
(1962= 100)
. 1953 1957 1961 19621963.1964
BASED ON NBER INTERNATIONAL PRICE INDEXES
Relative to U.K.
Passenger cars 109 105 106 100 101 106
Commercial vehicles 94 104 106 100 103 110
All motor vehicles 104 105 106 100 102 107
Relative to EEC
Passenger cars 114 113 102 100 102 102
Commercial vehicles 95 91 102 100 104 110
All motorvehicles 107 105 102 100 103 104
Relative to Germany
Passenger cars 106 107 101 100 102 100
Commercial vehicles 95 91 102 100 103 107
Allmotor vehicles 102 102 101 100 102 102
BASED ON WHOLESALE PRICE INDEXES
Relative to Germany
Passenger cars 121 95 96 100 102 102
Commercial vehicles 111 95 98 100 102 .102
All motor vehicles 118 95 97 100 100 102
Relative to France
Passengercars 143 132 97 100 103 104
Commercialvehicles 124 120 98 100 104 108
All motor vehicles 137 128 98 100 103 105
Relative to Japan
Passenger cars 196 128 101 100 100 96
Commercial vehicles 126 117 101 100 100 100
All motor vehicles 169 124 101 100 99 98
Note: Figures show ratios of foreign to U.S. international price indexes. The inter-
national price indexes used in each foreign-U.S. comparison for the table axe comparable
in coverage and method, while those in Table 14.12 represent the best estimates that
could be made for each country, regardless of comparability. The differences, how-
ever are slight.
Source: Appendixes D and F.Transport Equipment 451
different results in each of the four comparisons we made—of home
prices, of prices in the U.S. market, of prices in the U.K. market, and
of prices in the French market. We regard the comparisons made for
the domestic markets and for the French market as the most reliable,
but knowing that some motor car manufacturers pursue pricing policies
that discriminate between various markets, we do not feel warranted
in discarding the other two sets of results.
Even if all four sets of results were perfectly reliable, their valid
combination into overall averages for each pair of countries would re-
quire knowledge that we do not possess. That is, we would have to
know to what extent the price relationships observed in these com-
parisons represent other export markets for which we have no data.
In the absence of this information, we used the U.S. market price re-
lationships to represent the 18 per cent of world exports that went to
the United States and Canada, the U.K. market data to carry the 21
per cent weight of exports to OECD Europe other than the EEC, the
French market data to stand for the 33 per cent of exports to the Com-
mon Market, and the home market comparisons to represent the 28
per cent of world exports that went to other destinations.21 The results
for 1964 are: United States, 100; United Kingdom, 84; Germany, 89;
France, 114; and Italy, 102.
Thus, this method of averaging indicates that U.S. and Italian pas-
senger car export prices were about the same, that U.K. and German
passenger car export prices were lower (and not very different from one
another), and that French prices were higher.
Regression methods like those used to derive the automobile results
could be employed in the case of trucks only for the U.K.-U.S. com-
parison.22 Our data indicated widely differing U.K.-U.S. price relation-
ships for diesel- and gasoline-powered trucks, and since U.S. diesel
21 The weights refer to 1963, the year used for weighting purposes in the study as a
whole.
22 The numbers of trucks included in the sample by size and type of engine, were as
follows:
United States United Kingdom
GVW (lbs.) DieselGasTotal DieselGas Total
Under 6,000 0 3 3 2 4 6
6,000—9,999 0 2 2 2 2 4
10,000—14,999 0 3 3 4 4 8
15,000—19,999 0 3 3 12 14 26
20,000—24,999 5 21 26 14 20 34
25,000—29,999 2 8 10 11 3 14
Total 7 40 47 45 47 92452 Product Reports
observations were available only for large trucks, it seemed best to treat
the two kinds of trucks separately. A pooled U.K.-U.S. double log
regression for gasoline trucks indicated that U.K. list export prices were
9 per cent higher than those of the United States.23 When, on the other
hand, the United Kingdom prices of the seven U.S. diesel trucks were
estimated from a U.K. equation for diesels only,24 the U.K.-U.S. price
relatives ranged from 41 to 53andaveraged 49. Our overall estimate
for trucks thus turns critically on the relative importance of diesel and
gasoline trucks in OECD exports. On the basis of very incomplete in-
formation,25 we place the share of diesels at one-third. On this basis,
the U.K.-U.S. relative for trucks comes to 88. We also had more than
a score of direct export price comparisons for 196 1—64 from foreign
purchasers, including a number of comparisons based on bidding pro-
cedures. Many of these were for heavy trucks designed for construction
projects, such as dump trucks and cement mixers, and the United States
tended to show up more favorably; U.K. prices were 8 per cent higher
on the average. Ideally, we should have had trade data on the impor-
tance of these kinds of trucks relative to urban or interurban delivery
trucks, but we simpl.y averaged the results of the direct comparisons
and the regressions. When we added bid data for special-purpose ve-
hicles (e.g., trucks equipped with cranes) and road tractors, allowing
these to represent 15 per cent of total commercial vehicle exports and
trucks, the other 85percent, our final estimate of the U.K.-U.S. price
relative for commercial vehicles came to 100.
The evidence on the price position of German trucks relative to that
of the United States and the United Kingdom pointed fairly consistently
to higher German prices. The list export prices of the four rather small
trucks used for the measurement of time-to-time price changes were
about 5percent. higher than U.K. prices estimated from a U.K. equa-
28 .9840.Independent variables: GVW,wheelbase,displacement, and dummies
for cowl and forward control. Coefficients more than two times their standard errors
except forward control (1.9). Retained slope dummies: cowl and displacement.
24 R2.91. Independent variables: GVW, wheelbase, displacement, and dummies for
cowl and forward control. The forward control coefficient was 1.5 times its standard
error; all others were more than two times their standard errors.
25 Diesels were 18 per cent of the total dollar value of 1964 truck exports for the
United States and probably between 40 and 45 per cent of the value of U.K. exports.
If itis assumed that the other OECD countries had diesel ratios of around 40 per
cent the trade shares of Table 14.6 indicate that diesels accounted for about one-third
of truck exports (United States Exports of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise; Com-
modity by Country of Destination, 1964 Annual, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Report FT
410, June 1965; Accounts Relating to the Trade and Navigation of the United Kin g-
dom, U.K. Board of Trade, December 1964).Transport Equipment 453
tion for gasoline trucks.28 However, two private purchasers, one in the
United States and one abroad, reported German prices for smaller
vehicles at about the same level as or lower than the U.S. prices. In
international bidding, on the other hand, German prices turned out to
be substantially higher (not as much higher for special-purpose vehicles
as for ordinary trucks). Putting together these various sources of in-
formation as in the U.K.-U.S. comparison, we arrived at a German-
U.S. price relative for commercial vehicles of 105. Scattered bid data
and price comparisons by purchasers indicate that French and Italian
commercial vehicle export prices were in general slightly higher than
German ones.
The estimates for bodies and parts (SITC 732.8), the remaining major
component of SITC 732, were based on direct U.K.-U.S. comparisons
of about sixty parts and on direct German-U.S. comparisons of about
forty parts. Most of the data came from a survey made by a major
manufacturer to select its own sources of supply; the rest of the infor-
mation came from two equipment manufacturers and several purchasers.
Although there was a wide dispersion of price relatives, U.K. prices
tended to be higher than those of the United States, and German and
EEC prices higher still.
Our final 1964 indexes for motor vehicle price levels are: United
States, 100; United Kingdom, 93; EEC, 106; Germany, 100.
Aircraft 27
Trade
The United States was by far the chief exporter of aircraft and parts,
accounting for more than half of all exports in 1963 (Table 14.15).
Next in importance, but far behind, came the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, France, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Italy, and Germany.
The EEC countries as a group were responsible for almost one-third of
OECD exports.
26The equation (R2 =.98)is analogous to that used in the pooled U.K.-U.S. re-
gression and gives the same result for the U.K.-U.S. price relative (108) when used
in conjunction with a corresponding U.S. equation. We did not estimate U.S. prices
for the German specifications because the displacement of the German trucks was
smaller than that of any trucks in the U.S. sample.
27SITC734. Value of OECD exports in 1963: $1.5 billion; 3.5 per cent of study









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thestatistics on aircraft exports, particularly those on destination,
have a number of deficiencies. Almost 40 per cent of OECD exports
are U.S. special-category items for which no destinations are shown.
Furthermore, the figures for the United States published by the United
Nations and the OECD contain numerous errors resulting from mis-
classification in the translation of U.S. export data into SITC categories.
(These errors, and the corrections made in the U.S. figures, are de-
scribed in the notes to Appendix A.) Another indication of unreliability
in the published information are the very large differences between
import and export records for the same pairs of countries. Germany,
for example, is reported as the destination for $133 mifflon in exports
of complete aircraft (SITC 734.1) from EEC countries, but reports
only $6 million in imports from these countries. Belgium reports ex-
ports of $18 miffion in complete aircraft to the United Kingdom, but the
United Kingdom reports less than $9 million in imports of all aircraft
and parts (probably mostly parts) from all countries except the United
States, France,. Canada, and the Commonwealth. The most likely ex-
planation for at least some of these discrepancies is that military air-
craft were involved, and therefore importing countries did not report
them for security reasons or because they were for the use of inter-
national forces.
The destinations of U.S. aircraft and parts exports, as far as they
could be surmised from the data, were less concentrated in Europe
than those of the EEC countries (see sources listed in Appendix A).
Almost two-thirds of EEC exports were to other EEC countries; and
more than three-quarters, to OECD Europe. The U.S. ratios, estimated
from import data, were one-third to the EEC and one-half to OECD
Europe. The U.K. export ratios to Europe were even lower. The true
U.S. ratios were undoubtedly lower than the reported ones because
unreported exports must have been mainly to countries outside Europe.
Exports by countries other than the United States and the United
Kingdom are, in a sense, inflated by the process of subcontracting large
portions of the total cost of an aircraft to other countries. The individual
part is thus frequently reported twice in the export data, once as a part
and once as part of a complete aircraft. The Fokker Friendship, one
of the main factors in Netherlands aircraft exports, includes elements
manufactured In the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.28 The
28 "That Company, Fokker," Economist, August 28, 1965.456 ProductReports
building of F104 and F1O4G fighter aircraft, some of which were ex-
ported by four European countries, Canada, and Japan, at a cost of
$2.8 billion, resulted in $1.2 billion of expenditures in the United
States, more than 40 per cent of the total.29 The largest element of
"duplication" in aircraft exports probably consists of engines (SITC
711.4 when reported separately), but electronic equipment and other
items are also important.
Parts of aircraft, with other minor items, make up about 45 per cent
of exports. The United Kingdom showed a considerably higher ratio of
parts to complete aircraft than the United States or the Continental
countries; and Japan, a lower ratio. One reason for the high U.K. ratio
may be its decline as an aircraft supplier, which means that the ratio of
old aircraft in use to new aircraft exported is higher for planes of U.K.
manufacture than for aircraft produced by other countries.
The main change in the direction of trade in aircraft and parts was
the rise of the EEC countries from a negligible level in 1953 to almost
30 per cent of OECD exports in 1963 and 1964 (Table 14.15). The
U.S. proportion, around 80 per cent in 1953, had shrunk to less than
50 per cent by the end of the period.
Non price Factors in Trade
Clearly, many factors governing the flow of trade in aircraft and parts
are not reflected in prices as we are able to measure them. Among these
are the early availability of new types of aircraft, delivery time, reliability
of service, subsidies, free services included as part of sales contracts,
compatabiity with existing equipment, trade-in deals, and the cost of
credit. These could, theoretically, be priced if we had adequate informa-
tion, and the purchasing agencies presumably do put prices on them.
That is, each purchaser evaluates the utility of these factors to his own
company.
Some nonprice factors cannot be evaluated by the purchasers. These
involve governmental decisions based on interests outside those of the
purchasing agency; for example, consideration of employment levels in
the domestic aircraft industry or prospects of promoting exports by that
or other domestic industries.
An example of the influence of nonprice factors was the purchase of
29 "U.S. Balance Fattened by Plane Purchases," New York Herald Tribune, July
1965.Transport Equipment 457
the Super VC-1O by BOAC in the early 1960s. The decision to buy this
aircraft was widely reported to be contrary to the wishes of the manage-
ment of the airline, and was clearly a measure of support for the British
aircraft industry.30
Other cases of the influence of factors external to the purchaser in-
volved the purchase of aircraft as a quid pro quo for the purchase of
parts or other items by the aircraft supplier. A possible arrangement for
building British jet plane parts in Germany was expected to involve the
requirement that a German airline would be committed to buying
British aircraft. A British purchase of U.S. military aircraft included,
as part of the trade, a waiver of buy-American rules to enable British
firms to compete on equal terms with U.S. firms for American defense
contracts. The arrangement included a suspension of buy-American
provisions for some amount of British military sales to the United States
and an agreement by the Americans not to compete with the British
for military sales in the Middle East market, so that Great Britain's
military orders there could balance the cost of its U.S. purchases.81
Military aircraft and parts, again, are purchased under a number of
different types of arrangement, including substantial subsidies not re-
flected in quoted prices. In the case of the $2,753 million program for
equipping European countries with F104 fighter aircraft, the United
States contributed $215 million of the $1,159 million which was spent
in the United States. It was reported that U.S. and British bidders for
an Argentine civil aircraft order offered military aircraft at low prices
as part of a tie-in sale. Quite commonly an aircraft supplier will take an
existing fleet in trade-in as part of a sale of new aircraft.32
Among the larger civil airlines the most important factors are prob-
ably service and the economy of standardization. The size of American
aircraft companies, a result of the large scale of U.S. military procure-
30 "Over the Atlantic," Economist, March 13, 1965; "The New Battle of Britain:
Can Air Industry Survive," New York Herald Tribune, March 12, 1965; "BOAC Buys
British, Boeing 707's Stymied," ibid., July 20, 1964; "Britain Expected to Ask BOAC
to Make Good Order for VC-10 Planes," Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1964; "Second
Best?"Economist, June 16, 1962.
81 "America Expects Every Briton...," Economist,January 13, 1968; "Arms Ex-
ports, On the Warpath," ibid., February 4, 1967; "Arms Sales: Markets Are Where You
Find Them," ibid., May 7,1966; "Defence: The Next Orders," ibid., February 26,
1966.
82 "West German Company Is Discussing Making British Jet-Plane Parts," Wall Street
Journal, June 22, 1964; "The Next Orders," Economist, February 26, 1966; "U.S. Bal-
ance Fattened by Plane Purchases," New York Herald Tribune, July 1965; "Argentina
Given War Plans Offers," New York Times, March 3, 1965; "3 Companies Woo Mid-
east Airlines," ibid., March 22, 1965.458 Product Reports
ment and civilian aircraft purchases, is probably of great benefit in inter-
national competition, partly because a purchaser, faced with two similar
aircraft, will buy from the larger firm in the expectation that service will
be superior.33 The large company has another, related, advantage, in
that it can offer a wider variety of aircraft, all sharing certain spare parts.
An airline can standardize on.one supplier for several types of aircraft,
thus economizing on stocks of parts and' probably on the learning time
of its mechanics as well. This economy, among other factors, may ex-
plain the speed with which American companies came to dominate the
short-range jet market despite a very late start compared with the
British.34
Changes over time in the type of aircraft purchased also affect mar-
ket shares of the main exporters. The market for commercial jet aircraft
has gone through several phases, each of which favored one or the other
major exporter. During 1955—57, for example, purchases of long-range
aircraft were particularly important, and the United States met virtually
no competition in that class. At the end of the period demand surged
for small jets to replace piston aircraft on shorter flights. This demand
was beneficial to British manufacturers, who began production of such
aircraft two years before the first American company to enter the field.
The advantage may have been temporary, but it did affect the flow of
orders for several years.85
Price Trends
Prices for aircraft and parts sold by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France rose steadily during this period (Table 14.16).
U.S. prices for complete aircraft rose less than those of the other two
countries, but parts prices seem to have risen at least as quickly in the
United States as in the European countries.
The French index is very weak. For one thing the data cover essen-
tially one aircraft, the middle-range Caravelle, in various versions, while
the U.K. and U.S. prices cover a range from the comparatively small
jets, such as the Douglas DC-9, and the BAC- 111, through the large
83 "That Company, Fokker," Economist, August 28, 1965.
84 "War of Small Jets," Economist, February 27, 1965; "British Pin Hopes on Selling
Shorter-Range Craft in the U.S.," New York Times, April 11, 1965; "Boeing is Making
Short-Range Jets," ibid., February 20, 1965.
35 "Industry Awaits UAL Jet Choice," New York Herald Tribune, March 22, 1965;
"United to Buy 75 Jetliners for Record $375 Million," New York Times, April 6,
1965; also see sources in previous footnote.Transport Equipment 459
Table 14.16
International Prices, Aircraft and Parts, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962 =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
AIRCRAFTAND PARTS(SITC 734)
U.s. 83 89 99 100 102 108
U.K. NA NA NA 100 108 112
France NA 76 93 100 102 104
COMPLETEAIRCRAFT(SITC 734.1)
U.S. 80 86 95 100 103 104
U.K. NA 74 97 100 106 107
France NA 69 93 100 103 107
Source: Appendix C.
transatlantic aircraft. Also, improvements in the Caravelle have prob-
ably not been adequately accounted for, and the price increase therefore
includes more unidentified quality change than the U.S. index, for which
we had a finer breakdown of aircraft by type.
All these time-to-time indexes are based on price series for individual
aircraft types, in which an attempt was made to compare the price of an
identical aircraft in several years. However, this method does not measure
the decline in the efficiency price of air transportation equipment, mostly
decreases in costs resulting from the shift to larger and faster planes,
and particularly the shift from piston to jet aircraft. The older aircraft
were forced from the market altogether, or pushed into different types of
route, where they did not have to compete with the new models. We
can rarely observe the decline in price of older models which would
permit us to measure the degree of quality improvement contained in
the new models, although a study of the active market for secondhand
aircraft might permit some judgments on this score.96
Some indication of the degree of quality improvement involved in the
change from piston to jet aircraft is given by data on operating costs
of various types of aircraft.31 We can compare the 1963 direct operating
86Amethod for using secondhand prices is described in Philip Cagan, "Measuring
Quality Changes and the Purchasing Power of Money: An Exploratory Study of Auto-
mobiles," National Banking Review, December 1965.
37"Abasic reason for the sizable and continuing acquisition of jet aircraft by the
trunk airlines is evident from ...unitcost data.... In1963, as in previous years,460 Product Reports
costs per seat-mile for the types of aircraft delivered to U.S. airlines
in 1963 (mainly four-engine jets) with the 1963 costs for the types of
aircraft delivered in 1953 (mainly two- and four-engine piston air-
craft)Costsfor the older plane types were 2.49 cents per seat-mile;
and for the newer types, only 1.65 cents per seat-mile, mainly because
the new planes were larger and faster than the old ones but partly also
because jet engines are cheaper to maintain.
For many reasons this comparison cannot be used as a direct measure
of the decline in price of air transport equipment. The piston aircraft in
use in 1963 may have cost more to operate than the jets not only be-
cause of their size and engine characteristics but also because they were
older than the jet aircraft and because they were used on shorter routes
for which jets might have been uneconomical. However, it does not
seem likely that these factors account for most of the difference in cost,
in view of the difference in seating capacity (around 50 for the older
planes as compared with more than 100 for the later types), and in
speed (200 miles an hour as compared with more than 450).
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a quality- or pro-
ductivity-adjusted index of U.S. aircraft prices would show a decline
between 1953 and 1963 instead of the price increase of almost 30 per
cent given in Table 14.16.
Price Levels
Very little information on comparative aircraft price levels was col-
lected in the course of this study. Ideally we would have wished to
gather data on comparative capital costs and operating costs for various
aircraft from the airlines that were contemplating purchases. Lacking
these, we can only suggest a rough approximation derived from press
discussion and other published information.
We estimated that U.K. prices in 1964 were more than 10 per cent
above U.S. prices for roughly comparable aircraft(Table 14.17).
Price ratios for the other years suggest that U.K. prices were higher
unit costs of the 4-engine jets were substantially lower than those of either piston-
engine or turboprop aircraft.Direct operating costs of thejets...averaged
1.50 cents per seat-mile...4-enginepiston aircraft averaged ...2.61cents per seat-
mile while... 4-engineturboprops averaged ... 2.36cents per seat-mile"(Direct
Operating Costs and Other Performance Characteristics of Transport Aircraft in Air-
line Service, Calendar Year 1963, Federal Aviation Agency, July 1964, p. 5).
38Theseare not, of course, necessarily the same aircraft as were delivered in 1953.
A single model is sold for several years, and those of 1953 type in operation in 1963
may have been purchased in 1954 or later.Transport Equipment 461
Table 14.17
U.K. International Price Levels, Aircraft, 1957, 1961—64
(U.S. =100)
Year Index Year Index
1957 93 1963 111
1961 110 1964 111
1962 107
Source: AppendixE.
than U.S. prices by close to 10 per cent in each year except 1957, when
they were lower. These ratios apply to complete aircraft, but we did
not combine them with our parts price ratios. The latter varied widely
and therefore produced an unreliable index; furthermore, the data
covered parts of American aircraft, the price ratios for which might not
have been typical of aircraft in general. For these parts the data we
collected showed U.K. prices more than twice as high as U.S. prices.
Among the various types of aircraft, the U.S. price position appeared
to be strongest in the long-range aircraft and weakest in those of short-
est range. During 196 1—63 the ratio of U.K. to U.S. aircraft orders was,
correspondingly, lowest for the very long-range planes and highest for
the short-range ones. The relationship, which was calculated on the basis
of gross orders, would have been even stronger if it had taken account
of the large number of cancellations of orders for British aircraft during
these years, for planes ordered earlier, and in later years, for planes
ordered in 1961—63. The data on aircraft sales thus tend to confirm the
order of the price ratios.
A different measure of place-to-place price differences can be derived
from the operating cost data discussed earlier. Only a few foreign air-
craft were in service in the United States in 1963, but these permit some
very rough price comparisons. Neither the British nor the French aircraft
had exact U.S.-made counterparts, but both were in the high ranges of
direct operating costs per seat-mile: 2.88 cents for the Caravelle and
2.19 and 2.87 cents for the two Vickers planes. These levels were
similar to the costs of U.S. piston aircraft (2.61 cents) and U.S. turbo-
props (2.29 and 2.55 cents—the latter for a local-service aircraft), but
were considerably more expensive than the American jet aircraft which462 Product Reports
were replacing them. The large American jets in operation in 1963 had
average costs of 1.50 cents per seat-mile, and the smaller Boeing, the
727, appearing in the records for the first time in 1964, had costs of
slightly over 1.50 cents.
Price Competitiveness
U.S. price competitiveness in aircraft and parts apparently increased
from 1957 to 1963 but declined somewhat in 1964 (Table 14.18).
However, since the parts indexes are a very narrow selection of the total
trade in parts, the indexes for complete aircraft, which do not show the
1964 decline, might represent price competitiveness in aircraft and
parts better than the indexes that include parts prices.
The indexes of U.S. price competitiveness relative to the United
Kingdom do not seem unreasonable in relation to the trade data of
Table 14.15. The least favorable price relationship for the United States
was in 1957, and that was the year in which U.K. exports were relatively
(and absolutely) highest. The U.S. price position improved greatly by
1961, declined slightly, and then improved somewhat, while U.S. ex-
ports reached their peak relative to those of the United Kingdom in
1962 and then fell back somewhat. Thus the trade flows for the United
States and United Kingdom do not seem inconsistent with the price
competitiveness indexes we have compiled, particularly in view of the
coverage differences.
Table 14.18
U.S. Price Competitiveness, Aircraft and Parts, 1957, 1961—64
(1962 =100)
1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
AIRCRAFTAND PARTS
Relative to
U.K. NA NA 100 106 103
France 85 94 100 100 96
COMPLETEAIRCRAFT
Relative to
U.K. 86 102 100 103 103
France 80 98 100 101 103
Source: Appendix D.Transport Equipment 463
On the other hand, the movement of United States prices relative to
France does not explain the great increase in the EEC share of world
trade in aircraft and parts, from 3 to 32 per cent of OECD exports.
The bulk of the growth in EEC exports after 1961 took place in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, for which we have no price data. We suspect
that much of the growth must have taken place in military aircraft,
Belgium was not an impbrtant competitor for civil aircraft orders and
the Netherlands' main civilianaircraft,the highly successful P.27
Friendship (perhaps involving roughly $300 million in sales over a
ten-year period, including spare parts)could not account for sales
reaching beyond $130 million in 1963 and over $200 million in 1964.
Ships and Boats 40
Trade
Japan was the leading exporter of ships andboatsin 1963, account-
ing for nearly one-fourth of OECD exports, with Germany, Sweden,
Great Britain, and France as the other major shipbuilders for the world
market (Table 14.19).
The figures on exports to the United States understate its role as
a source of the orders that give rise to other OECD countries' exports.41
The reason is that purchases of foreign-built ships by U.S. companies
were often made through affiliates and subsidiaries which then operated
the vessels under Liberian, Panamanian, or other foreign flags.42 Such
arrangements seemed to be most common in connection with bulk car-
riers, which are specially designed for the low-cost loading, transport,
and unloading of some particular material—most often oil and, less
frequently, iron ore, bauxite, or coal. The owners of these vessels were
89 "Fokker Planes Keep Role in Europe," New York Times, December 4,1965;
"That Company, Fokker," Economist, August 28, 1965.
4°SITC735. Value of OECD exports in 1963: $1.5 billion; 3.5 per cent of study total.
41 Recreational craft, which are of minor importance in world trade, loom large in
U.S. trade. It should also be mentioned that the export figures for the United States,
and probably for other countries, include used ships even where the transfers of registry
change only the legal form and not the ultimate beneficiary of ownership.
42 More than one-fourth of the tonnage launched "for registration in other coun-
tries" in the six reference years of our study (1953, 1957, and 1961—64) was for Liberian
registry, and U.S. firms were probably responsible for a large percentage of these
orders (Lloyds Register of Shipping, Annual Summary of Merchant Ships Launched
During 1964, London, 1965, and earlier issues). Aside from the United States, Greek
shipowners are the largest users of "flags of convenience," as the Liberian, etc., regis-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































freer to buy ships in the cheapest shipbuilding country than the opera-
tors of general cargo or passenger vessels. As a result, bulk cargo vessels
tended to be more important in exports than in world production.43
Japan, which accounted for only about 11 per cent of world launch-
ings and 12 per cent of exports (on a gross tonnage basis)" in 1953,
emerged during the period as the world's greatest shipbuilding country;
in 1964, its total launchings were 40 per cent and its export launchings
50 per cent of the world totals. The United States virtually disappeared
from the world market; and the United Kingdom, which was the leader
at the beginning of the period, had its share reduced from over 20 per
cent in 1953 to 3 per cent in 1964 (Table 14.20)TheGerman share
also declined, while Sweden was able to maintain its position in the
rapid expansion of the 196 1—64 period largely by continuing its domi-
nation of the important Norwegian market. The Japanese ascendancy
cannot be ascribed to efficient imitation of Western methods with low-
wage labor; it is attributable, in part at least, to leadership in designing
and building larger and more automated ships, particularly tankers,
that have enabled their owners to achieve substantial economies.46
Another factor favorable to Japan, according to U.S. and U.K. ship-
builders, was the high rate of utilization of its shipyards, made possible
in part by the rapid expansion of its own maritime fleet.4T
48 Tankers, for example, accounted for about 45 per cent of all tonnage launched
in the six reference years of our study, but for about 55 per cent of tonnage launched
for registration in countries other than the country of construction (ibid.).
44 tonnage is a measure of space available for cargo, crew, and passengers.
The other common measure of ship size, deadweight tonnage, is a measure of capacity
to carry weight; it is defined as the difference between the ship's displacement at load
and light drafts. Deadweight tonnage (DWT) runs higher than the gross tonnage; see,
for example, the figures on Japanese export ships in Table 14.26, below.
45 The relative importance of the EEC and Japan in 1963 as measured by the value
figures (Table 14.19) differs from that measured in tonnage (Table 14.20) because of
differences in coverage and in units of measurement. The OECD data used for exports
are expressed in dollar values and include all kinds of vessels, such as ferries, tugs,
and small fishing craft, while Lloyd's launchings are expressed in tons and are confined
to merchant ships of 100 gross tons or more.
46 See, for example, Wall Street Journal, August 22, 1963, and Journal of Commerce,
February 28, 1964, March 2,1964, March 29, 1965, and September 30,1965, for
accounts of developments in the Japanese industry. On the economy of large tankers,
an oil company estimated that fuel and crew economies enabled a 90,000 ton tanker
to carry oil at one-third to one-half the cost of the standard 16,600 ton tankers used
during World War II (New York Times, September 1, 1963). See also S. G. Sturmey,
British Shipping and World Competition, London, 1962, p. 265.
47 13 per cent of all tonnage launched in 1961-64 was Japanese built for
Japanese registry; Japan's launchings for foreign and domestic owners accounted for
about 30 per cent of the world total in the same period (Lloyds Register). The state-
ment in the text about the advantage of high utilization implies either that it encour-
ages the rapid adoption of new techniques or, what is more questionable, that average
cost rather than marginal cost pricing is followed in the shipbuilding industry.466 Product Reports
Table 14.20
Tonnage and Distribution of Ships Launched for Registration in
Other Countries, 1953, 1957,1961—64
Countryof Origin 1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
1,000GROSS TONS
U.s. 106 64 2 2
U.K 365 261 281 165 284 149
Germany 364 778 542 684 644 588
France 93 181 172 309 282 239
Netherlands 185 157 317 244 143 175
Italy 18 159 12 27 148 130
Sweden 242 437 479 596 698 830
Japan 201 1,513 748 877 1,497 2,721
World 1,7283,8863,1783,4504,3355,421
PER CENT
U.S. 6.1 1.6 0.1 a
U.K. 21.1 6.7 8.8 4.8 6.6 2.7
Germany 21.020.0 17.1 19,8 14.9 10.8
France 5.4 4.7 5.4 9.0 6.5 4.4
Netherlands 10.7 4.0 10.0 7.1 3.3 3.2
Italy 1.0 4.1 0.4 0.8 3.4 2.4
Sweden 14.0 11.2 15.1 17.3 16.1 15.3
Japan 11.6 38.9 23.5 25.4 34.5 50.2
World 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Annual Summary of Merchant Ships Launch-
edDuring 1964, London, 1965, and earlier issues. Excludes ships under 100 gross tons,
sailing vessels, and nonpropelled craft and ships built of wood.
aLess than 0.05 per cent.
Non price Factors in Trade
Operators of general cargo or passenger vessels of the major industrial
countries were under a variety of pressures to have their ships built in
domestic yards. Each country wished to maintain its own merchant
marine and shipbuilding capacity, the usual justification being the need
for such facilities for defense purposes. The measures adopted to carry
out this policy were varied; they included the restriction of coastwiseTransport Equipment 467
and government cargoes to domestic flag vessels, direct subsidies for
construction and operation, and tax relief, accelerated depreciation, and
special credit provisions.48 The United States, for example, reserved its
coastwise trade exclusively to U.S. flagships and required that at least
50percent of government-sponsored cargoes be transported in American
bottoms. Operating subsidies and cargo preferences were restricted to
ships constructed in U.s. yards, and construction subsidies were paid to
offset the higher cost to the operator as a result of building in U.S.
rather than foreign yards.49 Both operating and shipbuilding subsidies
were confined to vessels used in foreign commerce. Shipbuilding sub-
sidies were used by other countries, notably France and Italy, not only
to build ships for the domestic flag lines but also for foreign owners.
U.K. shipowners got more favorable tax treatment on new investment
than firms in other industries, and for a time the government provided
favorable credit terms for ships built in British yards. In Germany, ship-
builders received a turnover tax reimbursement equal to 7 per cent of
the final price to foreign buyers. when a ship was constructed for
foreigners, and in Japan, shipbuilders' exports were supported by the
provision of government credit on favorable terms.5°
These governmental measures not only caused ships flying the flags
of the main indUstrial countries such as the United States, Germany,
France, and Japan to be constructed domestically regardless of cost,5'-
and thus to reduce the volume of trade in ships, but also to maintain
larger world shipyard capacity than there otherwise would have been.
Given the large overhead costs of shipyards and the sensitivity of unit
costs to the rate of capacity utilization, the intense competition for busi-
48 Economic PoliciesandPractices: Subsidies to Shipbuilding by Eleven Countries,
Joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964. See also Sturmey, op. cit.
a review of the construction subsidy program see Statement of G. F. Nuse,
Construction Differential Subsidies, House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 89th Cong., 1st sess., March 3, 1965, pp. 40 f.
50 Japanese shipyards were also able to buy steel at especially low prices. The Euro-
pean Economic Commission, the executive body of the Common Market, concluded
that Japanese aids to shipbuilders, including low interest rates, long-term credits, and
subsidies for steel plate, were equivalent to a 10 per cent subsidy (European Com-
munity, Washington,. D.C., EEC Information Service, May 1966, p.14). It was re-
ported at the same time that French and Italian shipyards were receiving subsidies of
about 15 per cent (New York Times, April 18, 1965). See also Economist, September
15, 1962, pp. 1035—36 and March 20, 1965, p. 1293; the 1962 Economist article re-
ported subsidy rates in France and Italy higher than 15 per cent.
51 Hearings, Construction Differential Subsidies, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., April 7,8,
and 9, 1964, pp. 9—10. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands were exceptions;
at the end of 1962, for example, 29 per cent of ships under construction for U.K.
registry and 21 per cent of those for Netherlands registry were being built abroad.468 Product Reports
Table 14.21
International Price Indexes, Ships and Boats, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962 =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
U.s. 98 116 101 100 96 97
EEC 111 130 99 100 91 90
Germany 108 124 95 100 93 92
Japan 112 140 99 100 86 87
Source: Appendix C.
ness is not surprising. From time to time determined efforts of secondary
builders such as Yugoslavia and Spain to obtain orders added to the
price pressures.52
Whatever the competitive, technological, or other forces responsible,
world ship prices were substantially lower in 1964 than in 1953 despite
increases in wages and in the prices of materials used in shipbuilding.58
Prices
Prices in Europe and Japan rose more sharply than in the United
States under the impetus to demand given in 1957 by the Suez crisis,
but foreign prices also fell more drastically after that date, especially
the Japanese (Table 14.21). Japanese prices were more than 25 per
cent and Common Market prices about 15 per cent lower in 1964 than
in 1953, while U.S. prices were at about the same level at the two
terminal dates.54
We do not have enough direct information to produce a time-to-time
index for the United Kingdom. However, a widely recognized source
prepared estimates of the costs of ship construction for two or three
52 For further details about the statements made in this paragraph see ibid., pp. 76
and passim.; Committee of American Steamship Lines, Shipbuilding Survey, July 1961,
July 1962, and July 1963. In addition, an estimate made in 1960 placed Polish and
Yugoslav prices at 35 to 40 per cent of the United States at a time when German
and Japanese prices were estimated at 46 per cent of the United States (J. J. Henry,
"Shipbuilding Costs," Marine News, April 1960).
53 Average hourly earnings in U.S. manufacturing rose by 45 per cent (Economic
Report of the President, January 1966, p. 24) and more in the other industrial coun-
tries. One key material for shipbuilding, steel, increased in price by around 15 per cent
(Chapter 9). The steel price increase taken by itself might have been expected to
increase ship prices approximately 3 per cent (Metal Bulletin, May 8,1964, p. 12),
and there were, of course, other materials that increased in price.
54 See the appendix to this chapter for a regression analysis of Japanese ship prices.Transport Equipment 469
vessels of standard design and, also, of the prices of used vessels of the
same specifications. In order to convey a general impression of the
order of magnitude of export price changes in the United Kingdom, we





In Table 14.22 the price competitiveness of the U.S. vis-à-vis each
foreign area is by dividing each foreign index by the U.S.
international price index for ships. It is clear that except for a small
improvement relative to Europe between 1961 and 1962, the price
competitiveness of the United States declined, particularly between
1957 and 1961.
The indexes in the text are based on the estimates of ship prices for June of each
year made by the Fairplay Shipping Journal. The estimates refer to two or three ves-
sels of standard design, and larger and more modern vessels are substituted from time
to time for vessels formerly priced. The "building cost price" includes cost plus "full
overheads and a fair profit margin" ..."notin competition with other firms..
(ibid.,January 11, 1962, pp. 77 and 79). The "ready ship price" is the market price
of such a ship already in service. The relationship between these prices fluctuates with
changes in the cost of ship construction and changes in the demand for shipping
(freight rates). For our dates of reference, the prices follow:
Cargo Vessels
9,500 DWT 11,000—13,000 DWTBulk Carrier, 24,000 DWT
JuneBldg. Cost Ready PriceBldg. CostReady PriceBldg. CostReady Price
1953 620 600
1957 775 900 1080 1250
1961 730 650 1015 900
1962 1020 875 1320 1200
1963 1025 850 1330 1250
1964 1035 975 1340 1400
The data are from Fairplay Shipping Journal, January 11, 1962, pp. 77 and 79; ibid.,
January 13, 1966, pp. 89 and 91. Comments in the Fairplay articles presenting its
estimates make it clear that at least during the 1960s and perhaps also in 1953, actual
contracts were concluded at less than the building cost price. We based the index in
the text on the averages of the building cost and ready prices for. each vessel, except
for 1957 for which we used the building cost price.
The time-to-time indexes were derived by linking up price changes between successive
dates (and taking simple averages for the four out of the five links for which price
changes were available for two different ships). Indexes, based on building costs and
ready prices, are compared below with the index offered in the text (1962100):
19531957 1961 1962 1963 1964
Buildingcost 85 106 100 100 101 102
Ready price 95 143 103 100 101 114
Index in text 93 113 101 100 101 107470 Product Reports
Table 14.22
U.S. Price Competitiveness, Ships and Boats, 1953, 1957, 196 1—64
(1962= 100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
Relative to
EEC 114 112 98 100 95 93
Germany 110 106 94 100 97 95
Japan 114 120 98 100 90 90
Note: The U.K. index given in the text produces the following index of U.S. price
competitiveness relative to the United Kingdom: 1953, 97; 1957, 97; 1961, 100; 1962
100; 1963, 105;and 1964, 110.
Source: Appendix D.
This is shown also in Table 14.23 where the levels of ship prices
are compared. For the last few years of the period prices in Japan were
about half or even less and prices in Germany and the other EEC
countries a little more than half those of the United States. We have
less information about the U.K. levels. At the beginning of our period,
U.K. prices seem to have been as low as any in the world, but by 1957
they appear to have been well above those of Germany.58
It seems clear that the exclusion of the United States from the world
ship market is due to high prices and that the dominance of Japan is
due to low and declining prices. The role of prices is apparent in the
changes between 1953 and 1964 involving the other countries as well:
Rank with Respect to
increase in




Other EEC 2 2
Japan 1 1
56official report relating to 1959—61 summarized United Kingdom and Conti-
nental European bidding for 34 vessels by stating that over half of the Continental bids
were 12 to 17 per cent below the U.K. bids. See Shipbuilding Orders Placed Abroad
by British Shipowners, Report to Minister of Transport by Messrs. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., London, 1961, p. 5.
Price change is based on the ratio of 1964 to 1953 prices, and the ranking is
from low to high (from Table 14.21 and text). Export tonnage is ranked from high
to low (from Table 14.20). "Other EEC" covers France, Italy, and the Netherlands.Transport Equipment 471
Table 14.23
Price Levels, Ships and Boats, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(U.S. for each year100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
U.S. 100 100 100 100 100 100
EEC 68 66 58 59 56 55
Germany 62 60 53 56 54 53
Japan 59 62 50 51 46 46
Source: Appendix E.
The role of prices in this group cannot be ascertained simply by a
juxtaposition of contemporaneous price and quantity changes as can be
seen in the data below for German and Japanese prices and exports: 58
Movementsof
German Prices German as Percentage
Relative to of Japanese Export Tonnage
Japanese Prices Current1-yr. Lag2-yr. Lag
1953 96 180 366 69
1957 88 51 68 95
1961 97 73 78 43
1962 100 78 43 22
1963 108 43 22 23
1964 106 22 23
Ifthe terminal years are compared, we find, as already noted, a rise
in German relative prices and a substantial decline in relative exports.
However, if successive pairs of years are examined, we find a contrac-
tion of the German export share between 1953 and 1957, when German
price competitiveness improved, and a large expansion in German rela-
tive exports between 1957 and 1961, when German prices increased.
The connection between the price changes and relative exports is not
any better if a one-year lag is allowed for between the date of order, to
which the prices refer, and the date of launching, to which the tonnage
figures refer, but there is an improvement with a two-year lag. Even so,
58TheGerman-Japanese price ratios are computed from data in Table 14.21. The
German-Japanese tonnage ratios are from Table 14.20 and sources cited there.472 Product Reports
the decline in relative German exports which came in the last two years
seems quite large relative to the German prices. Among a number of
possible explanations for such situations, two seem to apply to this case.
First, some of the expansion in Japanese sales in the last two years
was to Dutch and other European shippers who had formerly bought
ships from European yards. By 1962, the differential between European
and Japanese prices bad widened enough to make worthwhile the incon-
venience and extra inspection costs of shifting purchases from Europe.59
A second factor is that the German yards were able to stay in the price
range in which they were bidding in the early 1960s only by setting
prices below their costs.°° The effort to maintain high utilization of
capacity could not, however, be sustained, particularly in the face of
further declines in Japanese prices. At least one large German yard was
forced out of business in 1962, and German shipbuilding contracted.
Total tonnage launched was 11 per cent less and export tonnage
launched was 14 per cent less in 1964 than in 1962, while for the world
as a whole the corresponding figures increased by 21 and 57 per cent.81
Delivery time is another element that has sometimes played a role in
determining trade flows. The closing of the Suez Canal in the fall of
1956, for example, created a large demand for shipping. Freight rates
soared, and there was a rush to place orders for large ships to move oil.
Delivery periods in major yards rose to three years. With freight rates so
high that the cost of a vessel might be paid off in a few trips, orders
were placed in U.s. yards which could offer quick delivery, albeit at
high prices.
In summary, in the period under study, competition in the world
shipbuilding industry was intense. The period was marked by a shift to
larger-size vessels, and by the emergence of Japan as the leading ship-
building nation. There were notable changes in international price rela-
tionships. Japanese prices declined most sharply, but there were also price
cuts in Germany and the other EEC countries. U.S. prices were about
the same at the end of the period as at the beginning, and U.K. prices
59Forexample, Dutch shipping officials reportedly stated in connection with one
order that went to Japan that if the 20 per cent differential had been reduced to 6
or 7 per cent it would have paid to place the order in Europe (Journal of Commerce,
February 16, 1965). Our estimates for 1964 do not place the average difference be-
tween Japanese and EEC prices as high as 20 per cent (cf. Table 14.23).
60Economist,September 5, 1962, pp. 1035—36.
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were higher. The changes in prices in the different countries, at least
for the period as a whole, were well correlated with the changes in
shares of the world market for ships.
Appendixes
Comparisons Among Various Measures of Diesel Locomotive
Price Trends
Diesel locomotives (SITC 731.3) provide an unusual opportunity for
comparing measures of price trends derived from different sets of data
and by different methods. We are interested in this comparison not only
because of the importance of locomotive exports, but also because it has
implications for measures of price change and price competitiveness in
other commodity areas.
Two types of data entered into the time-to-time indexes actually used
in this paper: ICC reports on locomotive purchases by railroads in the
United States, classified by type of locomotive; and export price data,
collected by the National Bureau from American locomotive producers
for this study. There is, in addition, a locomotive price index published
by the ICC without any detailed description of its construction. This
index does not appear to have been derived from the ICC purchase
data which we used for our index.
A further source of data is the information on bidding that is used to
calculate the place-to-place indexes described earlier. The chief defect
in the bidding data is the incompleteness of our knowledge of the charac-
teristics of the locomotives offered. This information on characteristics
could have been much more complete, but more detailed specifications
were not collected because they were not necessary for the primary
purpose of the bid data collection: place-to-place comparisons. For
these, it was only necessary to know which of the offers were com-
parable and met the specifications, whatever the specifications were. For
this reason we could standardize for only some of the characteristics in
making time-to-time comparisons, particularly horsepower, type of
transmission, and wheel arrangement. At times, however, there were
additional data giving type of body, more detailed information on
transmissions, or even specific model numbers.474 Product Reports
Table 14.24
Comparison of U.S. Time-to-time Indexes from Various Sources, Diesel













NBER indexes from ICC data
1. Linked 108104 92104 95 97
2. Regression 107 88a105 94 97
3. ICC index 110 100 100 100 100100
4. NBER index from
company export data NA 100 97 98 99 99
NBER index from bidding data
5. Selected data NANA103 97 98100
6. All data NANA109 94 98100
Note: For sources and general descriptions of series see text of this appendix. Figures
for 1964 in lines 4—6 include some early 1965 prices. Theyear 1959, in lines 5 and 6,
represents a combination of observations for dates ranging from fall 1959 through the
first half of 1960.
Lines 1 and 2 are based on virtually full coverage of domestic locomotive purchases,
from data published in various issues of Transport Statisticsofthe United States,
Interstate Commerce Commission. The company data of line 4are from no more than
six observations for each link, but the major producers and itemsare represented. The
selected bidding data of line S contain a somewhat larger number of observations, also
with coverage of all major U.S. producers, and the index of line 6 is basedon at least ten
observations for every link except the last.
a196111957
Several measures of time-to-time price movements, comparing pairs
of years, are given in Table 14.24. The indexes from ICC data on pur-
chases by U.S. railroads are shown in lines 1 and 2. The first of these
is a conventional index constructed by comparing each year's prices
with those of the preceding year for locomotives of identical horsepower
and wheel arrangement, with numbers purchased in the earlier year as
the weights. The second is a regression-based index, calculated by fitting
a linear regression line to price and horsepower of B-B62 locomotives
for each year, and pricing the locomotives actually bought in 1963 at
82Single-unitlocomotives with two four-wheel trucks, all driving axles.Transport Equipment 475
the prices (as described by the regression lines) of the other years. The
regression lines and coefficients of determination were as follows (Y
price, in dollars; X =horsepower):
Constant Coefficient Number of
Year Term of X i2 H.P. Categories
1964 $74,246 $54.80 .89 6
1963 13,766 84.97 .94 13
1962 17,995 88.80 .98 8
1961 21,970 82.73 .97 8
1957 10,971 100.29 .94 14
1953 28,912 85.20 .89 17
Theregression-based index was not used. for a number of reasons.
One was that differences in the coefficients from year to year were sub-
stantial, particularly in 1957 when the marginal cost per horsepower
was $100 instead of the $83—$89 of the other years through 1963. The
last year, 1964, is a special case because the data were from a different
source63 and were less complete. Another problem affecting the regres-
sion-based index was the shift toward higher-horsepower locomotives.
This shift meant that the earlier regressions contained more observations
at the lower horsepower levels while the later ones were concentrated
at the 2,000 horsepower and over range. The 1957 data in particular
were all for locomotives of 1,800 horsepower or less.
In any case, the trend in the price-horsepower regression line does
appear to have been downward, at least within the horsepower ranges
actually built.
The ICC indexes (line 3) are not fully annotated in any public source
but they are briefly described in one publication 84 as having been "de-
veloped from analyses of major construction contracts and projects
studies of carriers' returns to Valuation Order No. 14, joint studies made
with various railroad committees, well-known engineering and trade
publications, and information furnished by suppliers, manufacturers, and
individual carriers." However, the great degree of stability in the diesel
electric locomotive index (no change from 1957 through 1963) suggests
that it is not derived from data on prices actually paid.
68 Joint Equipment Committee Report, Costs of Railroad Equipment and Machinery,
Association of American Railroads, July 1, 1965.
64 "Schedule of Annual Indices for Carriers by Railroad,1914 through1963,"
Bureau of Accounts, Interstate Commerce Commission, mimeo., n.d.476 Product Reports
The NBER index from company export data is derived from informa-
tion on the prices at which U.S. producers actually offered specific loco-
motive models. The number of observations is small, but all the major
producers and most of the important models are represented. Some list
prices are included, and the major consequence of their exclusion would
be to lower the 1961/1957 index by a few points. There would be
virtually no effect after 1962.
The bidding data on which the last set of NBER indexes is based
are quite imperfect. However, their coverage of trade in locomotives is
more comprehensive than the company data, and they are therefore of
interest as a check on other measures. The time-to-time estimates do
not necessarily refer to the lowest bid from a country but rather com-
pare bids at two dates on comparable locomotives, identified by specifi-
cations on horsepower, body style, wheel arrangement, and, usually,
model number. Line 5isan index derived from a selection of the bid-
ding data for which a high degree of comparability was insured by the
completeness of specifications. It excludes incompletely identified loco-
motives; and, in particular, it omits a large amount of data from several
major bids in 1961 which drew particularly low offers from most coun-
tries on smaller locomotives and very high bids on the larger ones. These
bids are, however, included in line 6, for which the standard of selection
was not as high. For this index we tried to make comparisons for every
pair of bids, even where offers from two different companies had to be
matched or where locomotives of somewhat different horsepower had
to be compared, after a rough price adjustment for the differences in
power.
Despite the wide diversity of sources and the considerable defects
of the basic data, the various NBER indexes in Table 14.24 are alike
in several ways. In all of them U.S. prices decline from 1962 to 1963,
and decline or remain unchanged from 1963 to 1964. They all also show
a 1964 price level lower than that for 1961. There are greater differences
in 1961—62, and the bid data here support the company reports of price
declines. The widest range occurs in 1959—61, but the reason for these
large discrepancies is not clear.
The bid data, rough as they are, provide the only time-to-time corn-
parisons available for the United Kingdom and Japan, and for the EEC
countries as a group. These comparisons, for three subperiods between
1959 and 1963 and for the period as a whole, are shown in Table 14.25.Transport Equipment 477
Table 14.25
Comparison of Time-to-time Indexes from Bidding Data, Diesel










U.s. 109 94 98 99
EEC 95 124 87 102
All locomotives, selected data, U.S. 103 97 98 98
Locomotives of 800—1,500 H.P., all data
U.s. 91 108 96 95
U.K. 93 106 98 97
EEC 85 116 97 96
Japan 85117 96 95
Locomotives of 800—1,500 H.P., selecteddata
U.S. 102 96 96 95
U.K. 104 95 98 97
Note: U.S. data are described in notes to Table 14.24, lines 5and6.The U.K. and
EEC indexes axe each based on from 5to20 bids in each link, and the Japanese on only
1 to 7 observations. The comparison of the data from selected bids with the data from
all bids for the United States was used for some decisions on the comparability of
specifications from one bidding to another for foreign offers, since we had a greater
amount of detail, including company data, to aid in interpreting the U.S. bids.
EEC indexes are a combination of indexes for France, weighted twice, and Ger-
many, weighted once.
Data for 1959 include bids ranging from the fall of 1959 through June 1960 and
those for 1961. cover offers from late 1960 through the fall of 1961. The timing of the
comparisons is thus somewhat blurred, but itis comparable from one country to
another.
Allthe indexes for countries outside the United States, except the
EEC index for all locomotive sizes and all data,declined over the four
years,1959—63, taken as a whole, as did the U.S. indexes. There are
veryslight indications that U.S. prices fell more than those of the other
countries, but the differences are too small to deserve confidence. How-
ever, their combined evidence reinforces the impression of falling prices
derived from some of the other data presented earlier.
A rough comparison can be made between the German bidding data
underlying the EEC indexes in Table 14.25 and the German export
price information used in the text of this report, for Table 14.7. The478 Product Reports
bidding data are weak, and for that reason are not shown separately
in Table 14.25. The export price data cover not only diesel locomotives
but also electric locomotives and self-propelled railway cars, which to-
gether account for more of German exports than diesel locomotives.
Even within diesel locomotives, the export price data cover not only
diesel electric but also diesel hydraulic locomotives, for which we lack
bidding data.
Given these limitations of the comparison, the differences between
the two indexes shown below are not startling, although they cumulate
over time. The indexes for the first two years are quite close, but the
last period and the total for the four years show large discrepancies.
1961/19591962/19611963/1 9621963/1959
Bidding data 110 104 95 110
Export price data 112 107 101 121
The bidding data for the link for 1963/1962 are particularly sparse
and might be dismissed on that account were it not that the decline in
prices is confirmed by bidding and other data from most of the countries
other than Germany.
If the bidding data were continued for one more year the index would
show an even larger decline, while the export price index would rise
slightly. However, the number of observations in the bidding data is
too small to provide a reliable estimate of the change in price.
Regression-based International Price Index forJapanese 65
Tabulationswere obtained covering all contracts between Japanese
shipyards and foreign firms signed during the Japanese fiscal years 1957,
1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964.88 Of the total of 256 contracts, 229 re-
lated to cargo ships, tankers, and bulk carriers and the other 27 to a
variety of ships such as trawlers and scientific vessels. The latter were
deleted; so too were 24 contracts for information was incomplete
or so far out of line with the other data as to make it seem either errone-
ous or the consequence of special factors not known to us. As a result
65This summaryis based on the work of Steven Hitchner, a Swarthmore College
student who was an undergraduate research participant in a National Science Founda-
tion program at the University of Pennsylvania during the summer of 1966.
66TheJapanese fiscal year begins on April 1; thus our 1957 data, for example, refer
to the period April1, 1957, to March 31, 1958. For 1964, data were available only
for the first nine months of the fiscal year.Transport Equipment 479
Table 14.26
Japanese Export Ship Contracts, Summary of Data, 1957, 1961—64
19571961196219631964aTotal
No.of contracts 32 25 21 79 48205
Average
Price ($1,000) 7,0193,9685,7105,2534,4765,287
Gross tons (1,000) 17.628.631.425.123.1
Deadweight tons (1,000) 36.027.244.849.539.742.1
Horsepower (1,000) 13.210.715.416.813.914.8
Speed (m.p.h.) 15.215.3
Ships per contract 1.651.561.901.611.441.61
Proportion of contracts calling
for turbine engine 24%29% 8% 9%
Proportion of contracts for•
Tankers 56%28%57%63%36%51%
Bulk carriers 9 40 19 28 54 32
Cargo vessels 35 32 24 9 10 17
aData for first nine months of fiscal year (i.e., April—December 1964).
theanalysis was based on 205 contracts. The characteristics of the data
are summarized in Table 14.26. About one-third of the contracts called
for the building of more than one vessel; the average contract involved
1.6 ships. We treated each contract rather than each ship as a unit of
observation.
In addition to price and number of ships, information was available,
for at least one of the years, for gross tons, deadweight tons, horse-
power of the main engine, normal operating speed, type of engine
(diesel or turbine), and kind of ship (tanker, bulk carrier, or other).
However, only deadweight tons, horsepower, and number and type of
ship were available for all five of the years.
The basic procedure was to regress price against the variables relating
to the size, power, and other characteristics of the vessels. After sub-
stantial experimentation with various ways of calculating the relation-
ship, a logarithmic equation, in which the data for all the yearswere
pooled, was chosen as the best means for estimating changes in price480 Product Reports
during the period. The equation, which was computed in natural loga-
rithms, had anof.94 and a standard error of estimate equivalent to
3.1 per cent of the (geometric) mean price:
Log P =6.0874+ .3290 log DWT + .4356 log HP —.0513BC—
(.3378) (.0377) (.0450) (.0228)
.0597C+ .4810Y57+ .1369Y61 + .1488Y62 + .0174Y64
(.0415)(.0263) (.0294) (.0301) (.0230)
Thefirst three terms on the right represent the constant and the "prices"
of deadweight tons (DWT) and horsepower (HP) •67Inthe next two
terms, the prices of bulk carriers (BC) and cargo vessels (C) are com-
pared to the prices of tankers; the coefficients indicate that on the aver-
age, bulk carriers were 5 per cent and cargo vessels 6 per cent cheaper
than tankers, holding everything else (i.e., deadweight tons, horsepower,
and year) constant. The last four terms (in Y) in the equation show
the differences in prices between 1963 and each other year. For exam-
ple, the natural logarithm of price in 1957 was .48 10 higher than in
1963, all other things being equal; this is equivalent to a 62 per cent
difference. Converting this and the other coefficients to index numbers
on a 1963 base yields the following series: 881957,162; 1961, 115;
1962, 116; 1963, 100; 1964, 102.
In the balance of this appendix we discuss alternative computations
we made and explain our reasons for rejecting them in favor of the
estimates just summarized.
The log form produces directly, in the form of regression coefficients,
the estimates of the percentage change in prices between the observed
years. The arithmetic equation, on the other hand, gives the absolute
amount of the difference between two years. This seems less reasonable,
since we would ordinarily expect, for example, that the price increase
for an expensive ship would be in the same proportion rather than in
the same absolute amount as the price increase for a smaller, less costly
vessel. In the arithmetic form we must estimate a price from the equa-
tion by inserting appropriate values for the various vessel specifications
included in the equation.
67Observationsfor prices, deadweight tons, and horsepower are in thousands. The
figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.
68The1964 index is taken as 101 in Table 14.21, since a 1 per cent rather than a
2 per cent increase was indicated by a regression in which observations for similar
nine-month periods in 1963 and 1964 were included.Transport Equipment 481
Table 14.27
Ship Price Indexes Computed from Pooled Regressions, 1957, 196 1—64
1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
Logarithmic 162 115 116 100 102
Semilogarithmic 162 114 120 100 101
Arithmetic
1961 specifications 211 133 134 100 107
1963 specifications 163 119 119 100 104
Average specifications 174 122 123 100 105
Note: Independent variables: deadweight tons, horsepower, type of ship, and year.
The measure of percentage price change varies according to the choice
of specffications. In Table 14.27, for example, the indexes derived from
the arithmetic form on the basis of 1961 and 1963 average specifica-
tions, which differed more than any other pair, are compared with the
indexes derived from the logarithmic equation described above. If we
were using the arithmetic form, we would select the 1963 trade weights
in our study of international competition.
Aside from its other advantages, the log form gives a better fit to the
data; its is.94 compared to .87 for the arithmetic form.
The semiog form, in which the log of price is regressed against the
variables in natural numbers, shares many of the advantages of the log
form but for Japanese ships, itswas only .89 compared to .94 for
the log form. Its correlation was lower than the arithmetic one for most
of the combinations of independent variables we employed, except for
the combination reported upon, where it was slightly higher. It can be
seen from Table 14.27 that our indexes would not be much different if
we had used the semiog equation.69
Another question concerns the choice of independent variables used
in the equation to explain price. In addition to the variables we used in
the log equation described above, we had data on number of ships per
contract for all years, and on gross tons, operating speed, and type of
engine for some years.
69Asemilog regression of price in arithmetic numbers on the logarithms of the
independent variables consistently gave a poorer fit to the data than any of the other
forms; for the variables included in the above equation, for example, ityielded an
R2 of .81.482 Product Reports
The number-of-ships variable was excluded because its coefficient
was usually positive. It was ordinarily not large enough to be statistically
significant, we would normally expect a multiple order to reduce
the price per ship. If contract prices on multiple orders were indeed
higher, the reason may have been that shipowners with enough financial
strength to place multiple orders also were in a position to set special
requirements concerning the equipment of a ship or its general quality
which could not be measured through the variables about which we had
information. In any case, the inclusion of the number-of-ships variable
in the log equation did not change any of the price indexes.
The price indexes computed. from the regressions do not, indeed,
appear to be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of marginal variables
once enough are included to achieve high R2's. When gross tonnage, for
example, was added to the variables in the logarithmic equation set out
above, the indexes were changed by one or two points at the most. (The
pooled data in this case omitted 1957, for which gross tonnage figures
were not available.)
Of the variables that were included, deadweight tons and horsepower
obviously are important indicators of the capacity and power of a vessel.
They represent major cost factors to the shipbuilder and major elements
of utility to the shipowner. It also seemed desirable to differentiate
among tankers, cargo vessels, and bulk carriers.
Aside from questions of mathematical form and the appropriate inde-
pendent variables to include in the regression, the remaining important
issue is whether we should compare prices estimated from separate re-
gressions for each year rather than use the pooied regression we have
selected. The assumption underlying the pooled regression is that the
relative prices (i.e., coefficients) of horsepower, deadweight tons, and
type of ships were the same in all the years. Regressions computed for
individual years in fact yield very different coefficients from one time
to the next. The coefficients do not, however, appear to change in any
systematic or other way which can be rationalized in economic terms.
Furthermore, the individual-year regressions are necessarily based on a
smaller number of observations and their coefficients are therefore more
likely to be erratic. We prefer, therefore, to rely upon the pooled re-
gression.7°
70Forfurther discussion of these choices see Chapter 5.Transport Equipment 483
The indexes derived from the individual-year regressions are com-
pared below with those based on our preferred pooled regression:
19571961196219631964
Pooled, logarithmic 162 115 116 100 102
Individual year
Arithmetic
1963 specifications 171 119 120 100 100
1961 specifications 156 111 127 100 98
Average specifications 168 117 122 100 99
Logarithmic
1963 specifications 167 114 118 100 101
1961 specifications 144 109 115 100 100
Average specifications 159 113 117 100 101
It is necessary to present both arithmetic and log forms because the
log form is not consistently superior to the arithmetic for the individual
years.7' There are not, however, substantial differences between the two
sets of results. Furthermore, at the 1963 specifications, the ones of most
interest to us, the logarithmic regressions produce indexes that are close
to those of the pooled regression. The individual arithmetic regressions
yield measures of price change that are a little further away from those
derived from the pooled regression, but even between these sets of
results the largest difference is less than 6 per cent.
71Each,however, is consistently superior to either of the semilog forms; the differ-
ences in R2's are generally around .10.